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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TYLER D. BOYCE, 
Petitioner and Appellee 
-vs-
TAMMY L. GOBLE, 
Respondent and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE 
Case No. 990641-CA 
Priority 15 
Appellee, Tyler D. Boyce, hereinafter "Petitioner" submits the following brief: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 and 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated (1998). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Appellant correctly marshal the evidence for this appeal? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding that there existed a 
substantial change in circumstances to modify child support in this case? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in modifying child support on the facts 
of this case? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court must review the trial court' s interpretation of the child support guidelines 
for correctness to the extent it involves questions of statutory interpretation. Utah Sign, 
Inc. v. Utah Dept of Transp., 896 P.2d 632 (Utah 1995). In reviewing child support 
proceedings generally, the appellate courts accord substantial deference to the trial court's 
findings and should not disturb its actions, absent manifest injustice or inequity that 
indicates a clear abuse of discretion. Crockett v. Crockett 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d393 (Utah 1985). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Petitioner sets forth in the attached Addendum, the complete code provisions 
referenced in this brief as follows: 
1. §78-45-2(10) Utah Code Annotated (Definition of Joint Physical Custody) 
2. §78-45-7.2 Utah Code Annotated (Application of Guidelines) 
3. §78-45-8 Utah Code Annotated (Continuing Jurisdiction) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Second Judicial District Court, in and for 
Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, presiding. 
The parties in this action were divorced by Decree of Divorce entered in the Second 
Judicial District Court on or about November 25, 1997. That Decree awarded the parties 
joint legal and physical custody of their three minor children and awarded Petitioner "equal 
control and input into the children's lives" and "liberal rights of visitation." These vague 
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terms ill ilie i in i " * l,", " iinl"1, " hetv ivn ti1"" ""rt^* '^H ^^% filed cross petitions to 
modify less than a • *- n •* *r the divorce was entere :ii ignitions dleged that the 
Decree was "ur^nKn < v iiul proln* -^ . IMIIIIIHII. 
modification of child support, and orders defining 
cummumcaiN *r .unl treatment of the n. Respondent's petition sought to end the joint 
custody pro1* >f n ' i . ' • . . . .;^ d 
\ I S l l . ' l l l O l l l i ^ l l l N 
In the course of the action, the parties attended n *ihaiioh ana neann^ Dch re the 
i omniissioi.. : ni\ fk ume sharing 
^edule which was set forth m a stipuhn-d ("OL.: j . . JI entered February 18, 190S That 
schedule awarded Petitioner regulai visitation consisting ol alternate weekends lioni 
!"iitjay ni^hl uniil Mniiil.i1 ill i IIIIIIIJJ1 unv nuil-wrrk n\ e irnitih teach week; alternate holida) s 
per the standard schedule, 
At the time: of trial in this matter,, the remaining disputes were. In si, vvhai i luM 
si lppoi t: vv orksheet shoi ildbe applie i and whether there was a substantial material change 
in circumstances to justify a support modification. 
At trial,, (he I ourt Uniinl iLil llieie sveie malt inil elian^es in • u nmstim<vs .'<> hieh 
were not foreseeable at the time of di\ orcc - •- • supported a change in the child sup^  
amount V ^ deluded the lack of a defined •- isnauon schedule, the par. . 
agreemc... , *titioner' s household exp&i&cb 
for the umuion being higher than anticipated at the time of the Decree, Based on these 
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findings, the Court ruled that child support in this case should be based on a joint physical 
custody worksheet. 
The trial on the Petition for Modification was held July 13, 1998 before the 
Honorable Jon M. Memmott presiding. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration or 
New Trial under Rule 59, the matter was briefed and a hearing held April 20, 1999 before 
the Honorable Jon M. Memmott presiding. That motion was denied and the Order and 
transcript of the ruling well explains the overall findings of the trial court in this matter and 
is included in the Addendum. Respondent then filed a Motion for Stay of Judgment which 
was denied and this Notice of Appeal was filed on or about July 22, 1999. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner submits the following statement of relevant facts: 
1. These parties were divorced by Decree entered November 25, 1997. 
2. The Decree awarded the parties joint legal andjoint physical custody of their 
three minor children and awarded Petitioner "equal control and input into the children's 
lives" and "liberal rights of visitation." 
3. Petitioner, Tyler Boyce filed a Petition for Modification on or about 
August 4, 1997 seeking clarification and changes to the Decree concerning visitation and 
child support. He alleged that since the Decree, he generally had visitation from Friday 
evening until Monday morning on alternate weeks, a weekly midweek and 4 to 6 weeks in 
the summer. 
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4. ' •» • ' a fter the i'ivuice and Petitioner's access to the children 
became mon* i-ih uh MK! ,ess eleai I his led Petitioner to file a petition to modify for 
clarification ot the visitation terms in the I)caa\ 
hi-, Fammy L. Goble, filed an An sw er and Counter- Petit i on to 
Modiiv on .Aimust 1«, iw? seeking changes in custody and visnau* - ^ J}>I.- .^r 
p< v.uon allege*: >v had been a iiijiulit:»tiit iinil iiiit.ttn ml rhi s ^* * > m uidt 
the parties were unable to cooperate in joint custody and visitation air- nts. 
^he parties attended mediation with Dr. Matthew Duvies vvhichresohal I In1 
I'M • 
xhe parties appeared before Domestic Relations Commissioner David S. 
Dillon on February ix I'^di.il.^.iA.uii.iKo.r^i.u; .. . : . 
'
n
.-nft1: J with Respondent 64.5% of the time. Ihe .^a-
of child -U' 4rt revision \\<\* reserved for trial 
8. h.i i decree awarded child >uppoil of V'fi JR/I month lia.wcl m Pef11 ,,'M,, 
ii = - - -,: " 179 and Respondent's income of $1891. I hat support was calculated h: 
on a sole custody 'worksheet. 
9. 1 : * Honorable Jon M. Memmott 
presiding. The Court made the following Findings and Orders: 
(a) The Decree awarded joint legal and joint physical custody an i gai re 
Pdi t ii Hii'i' e< iii.il i ijjj'il;- ml vi Ml-ii I u MI 1 In1 ("'«mil found that "clearly there was joint physical 
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custody" with the language vague as to liberal visitation, more than standard. Further, that 
the record of visitation as of 1997 is that Petitioner had the children 38% of the time . . . 
(b) The Court found that it was the testimony of both parties that if the 
liberal visitation resulted in Petitioner having similar expenses to Respondent, that would 
represent an unanticipated change of circumstances and the Court made this finding. The 
Court then held, that the child support should be calculated by using a joint custody 
worksheet. 
(c) For purposes of child support calculation on a joint custody basis, the 
Court found the parties' incomes to be $3,279 gross per month for Petitioner and found that 
Respondent was not working and that she should have zero income imputed to her. This 
resulted in a support amount for three children under a joint custody calculation of $563 
per month. 
10. On November 6, 1998, Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration or 
New Trial based on Rule 59(c) URCP. 
11. A hearing was held on that Motion on April 29, 1999 before the Honorable 
Jon M. Memmott presiding and the Motion was denied. A copy of the Order on Motion 
for Reconsideration or New Trial and the transcript of this ruling is appended to this brief 
in the Addendum. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Respondent has failed to marshal the evidence for this Appeal. The 
appellate court cannot determine whether findings are erroneous or whether the exercise 
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of trial court discretion was proper, unless the Appellant properly marshals evidence. This 
Court has defined the marshaling requirement as requiring the Appellant to cite "every 
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial" that supports the trial court's findings. 
West Valley City vs. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). It is 
also evident that what facts the Appellant does include are one-sided and are selective facts 
favorable to Respondent's position, rather than properly marshaled evidence. 
2. The trial court understood and applied the correct legal standard for 
modification of child support. The Appellant asserts that the trial court confused the 
modification standard for child custody and the standard for child support. This is not the 
case. In fact, the Court adopted the schedule of liberal visitation mediated by the parties 
and calculated the percent of time sharing. The Court concluded that support be calculated 
using a joint physical custody worksheet. This was a correct result under the support 
guidelines and recent case law. Udy v. Udy 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard for Modification of Child Support 
(a) Standard of Utah Law for Support Modification 
The calculation of child support pursuant to fixed guidelines has been in 
place since July 1,1989 and is codified in the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, UCA 
§78-45-1 et seq. It is specifically stated that a court a shall "retain jurisdiction to modify 
or vacate the order of support where justice requires." UCA §78-45-8. See, Addendum. 
The main provisions for modification of the support guidelines are contained at UCA §78-
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45-7.2(6) and (7). For purposes of this appeal, the subparagraph (7)(a) is applicable and 
provides that "a parent may at any time petition the court to adjust the amount of child 
support if there has been a substantial change in circumstances." For purposes of that 
subsection, the statute provides examples for what a substantial change in circumstances 
may include such as: 
(i) material changes in custody; 
(ii) material changes in the relative well or assets of the parties; 
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent; 
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn; 
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; and 
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent for the 
support of others 
The statute also references the need for the court to determine the best 
interests of the child in a modification proceeding in the following terms: 
Upon receiving a petition under subsection (7)a, the court 
shall, taking into account the best interest of the child, 
determine whether a substantial change has occurred. If it has, 
the court shall then determine whether the change results in a 
difference of 15% or more between the amount of child 
support ordered the amount that would be required under the 
guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is 
not of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust the amount of 
child support ordered to that which is provided for in the 
guidelines. UCA §78-45-7.2 (7)(c). 
Arguably, if the support in a case was not to be determined under the 
guidelines, the court must refer to common law to determine if a substantial change of 
circumstances warranting modification of child support exists. Harrison v. Harrison 450 
P.2d 456 (Utah 1969). 
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(b) Was the Standard Applied Correctly to the Present Case? 
The Respondent alleges that the trial court herein confused the different 
standards for modifications of divorce orders. She references the modification standard of 
custody at UCA §30-3-10.4(l)(a) which outlines a basis for substantial changed 
circumstances as a custody decree becoming "unworkable or inappropriate under the 
circumstances." Respondent then leaps to the conclusion that the court in this case found 
an unworkable custody decree and on that basis, changed child support. There is no 
evidence that the trial court misunderstood the standard and no evidence that a wrong 
standard was applied in this case. In fact, quite the contrary is established on the record of 
proceedings. 
The court's reasoning in this area is well expressed in the hearing which took 
place on the Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, April 20,1999. A transcript of this 
ruling is included in the Addendum herein where the trial judge states: 
f f
. . . that they had agreed to joint physical and legal custody. 
That they had not been able to implement the visitation 
schedule. That the Court found a change of circumstances in 
the implementation of the visitation schedule." Addendum at 
A-7. 
It is clear that both parties in this case were dissatisfied with the reality of the joint legal 
and joint physical custody situation. The original decree was extremely brief and contained 
no detail on how that agreement was to work. Importantly, however, the parties never had 
much disagreement on the actual amount of time that Petitioner, Mr. Boyce was to spend 
with his children. In his petition, he alleged that he generally had the children Friday night 
-9-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
until Monday morning alternate weeks, and one additional midweek overnight, and six 
weeks in the summer. The parties attended mediation to resolve the petitions to modify and 
ended up with essentially this same schedule, but on a clear calendar rotation. This 
schedule was not in dispute at the time of trial and had already been ratified in a court order 
arising from an appearance before the Commissioner. 
Thus, the primary issue at the time of trial was whether the child support 
being paid by Petitioner at the time of Decree should be adjusted. As the trial court clearly 
stated in the above-quote, it is the application of the changed custody terms that resulted 
in the most clear substantial material change in circumstances in this case. The trial court 
for the first time in the divorce case, quantified the amount of visitation into percentage 
terms finding that Petitioner had the children in his care 35.5% of the time and Respondent 
had the children 64.5%. Based on these percentages, the trial court simply applied the law. 
This law is well defined in the statutes contained at UCA §78-45-2(10) which defines joint 
physical custody as a child staying with a parent "overnight for more than 25% of the year" 
and both parents contributing to the expenses of the child in addition to child support. 
Addendum at A-l. The court took evidence on the issue of what expenses were paid 
directly by Petitioner for the benefit of the children. The court was persuaded that there 
were substantial direct payments being made for the benefit of the children in addition to 
the child support paid to Respondent. The court also made the additional finding that the 
level of expenses was quite high and that both parties testified that this high level of 
expenses in fact not contemplated and was unforeseeable at the time of the Decree. 
-10-
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Respondent thus confuses the issue by claiming that the trial court applied 
a custody modification standard to the child support change in this case. That is simply not 
true. The trial court's finding of changed circumstances for support resulting from 
application of the newly defined visitation schedule is exactly within the purview of the 
statute at UCA §78-45-7.2(7)(b)(i) which references a "material change in custody" as a 
statutory basis for changing child support. The parties simply had not quantified the vague 
terms of liberal visitation set forth in their Decree before the modification trial. When that 
quantification took place, the parties clearly made a material change which required use of 
a joint custody worksheet. Although Respondent may complain that the visitation change 
in this case was a very small change, that is beside the point. There is a clear statutory 
directive that when overnights reach the level of 25% of the year, then child support will 
be calculated pursuant to a joint physical worksheet. Thus, if visitation had been a total of 
24% before a change and 25% after, then that 1% of change would absolutely result in a 
child support change under the application of the guidelines. It appears to be Respondent 
who is confused about the relationship of the custody modification procedures and not the 
trial court. The Respondent references the Hogge v. Hogge, standard as requiring a 
bifurcated procedure for changing child support. See Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 
1982). That case has nothing to do with child support modification and the circumstances 
at bar. Because we have a specific test, that is a visitation order which meets 25% of the 
overnights, there is no need to apply any other threshold test, rather the requirement to use 
-11-
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the joint worksheet is automatic. Where the legislature has spoken so clearly in a statute, 
it would be error for the court not to follow that mandate. 
(c) The Case Law Supports the Trial Court Ruling and Has Not Been 
Distinguished. 
At Ihe time of trial, the Petitioner pointed out to the court the controlling case 
law in this area set forth in the Court of Appeals decision of Udy v. Udy 893 P.2d 1097 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). Respondent does not even address this opinion in her brief. This 
case held that labels of custody such as sole or joint do not control the child support 
determination, rather, a trial court is required to follow the actual timesharing ordered in 
a case and to determine from that which worksheet to use. There is nothing in the case 
before the court that would take it out of the application of the Udy principle. 
There have now been additional decisions on the same point which merely 
emphasize the correctness of the trial court's ruling herein. The case ofRehn v. Rehn, 91A 
P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1999) has very similar facts to the present case. That was an appeal 
of a case where the parties stipulated to child support pursuant to the guidelines and the 
father received visitation which clearly exceeded 25% of the nights in the year. The trial 
court made the support calculation on a sole custody worksheet and the appeal followed. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals held that the stipulation of the parties was apparently 
only to use the child support guidelines and not to use of a sole custody worksheet. Based 
on the visitation award, the trial court was "required to follow the mandate of Utah's child 
support guidelines and use a 'joint custody child support worksheet' or make findings of 
-12-
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fact justifying its deviation." Citing Udy, 893 P.2d @ 1100. Certainly, if a trial court 
intends to deviate from strict application of the guidelines and finds such guidelines to be 
rebutted, it must set forth clear reasons to do so. 
There is no question that this line of cases represents the controlling law in 
this area and Respondent has put forth no evidence to distinguish this case from a strict 
application of the support guidelines which require use of a joint physical custody 
worksheet. For that reason, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed in all respects. 
II. The Findings of the Trial Court to Modify Support Herein Were Legally 
Sufficient 
The Respondent attacks the findings of the trial court and provides a series 
of case references. What Respondent fails to do however, is to state any specific factual 
finding that was omitted by the trial court and which was essential to the matter. 
The findings of the trial court are stated in the most detail in the order on 
Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial and in the transcript of the court's ruling on that 
Motion. Addendum at A-6 and A-15. In those documents, it is clearly stated that the 
parties stipulated at the outset of trial to joint legal and joint physical custody and to liberal 
visitation. The only required findings of the trial court were thus to quantify the visitation 
schedule which the court did, finding that Respondent had the children 63% of the time and 
the Petitioner had the children 37% of the time. The court then made a clear and correct 
legal conclusion from those percentages of time sharing, that the joint physical custody 
worksheet must be used to determine support in this case. Additionally, the court had to 
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make findings on income to apply the support formula and the court made clear and 
specific findings of the parties' incomes and changes since the time of Decree. After 
hearing the evidence, the court sua sponte, deemed that zero income should be imputed to 
Respondent for purposes of calculating support as since the time of the divorce, she had 
remarried, had another child and was staying home and not working as a school teacher for 
the time being. See, Paragraph 3, Order on Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial, 
Addendum at A-16. 
In the transcript of the ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration and in that Order, 
the court clarified the findings of substantial changed circumstances. In short, it was the 
application of the newly defined and clarified custody/visitation terms that resulted in 
needing to adjust child support. The court quantified the percentages of visitation based 
on the mediated agreement of the parties and based on the fact that Petitioner would have 
the children more than 25% of the nights, the court found it appropriate to adjust child 
support and use a joint custody worksheet. Additional findings were also made, that there 
were unforeseeably higher expenses being paid by Petitioner for the benefit of the children 
in his home in addition to his payment of child support. These were certainly sufficient 
findings to support the modification orders of the court in this matter and were not vague 
or unclear. 
III. The Appellant Failed to Meet the Marshaling Requirements on Appeal. 
This Court has stated on many occasions that a critical requirement of 
appellate advocacy is the duty of the Appellant to marshal the evidence when challenging 
-14-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the trial court's findings of fact. Respondent herein made no effort to marshal the evidence 
in the case. As set forth in the preceding argument section, the trial court made clear and 
sufficient findings of fact to support the modification of child support. None of these are 
referenced in the Respondent's brief and he has thus failed to meet the marshaling 
requirement. All Respondent provides in his brief are conclusory allegations that the trial 
court's findings were insufficient. Given a review of the rulings in this case, both a 
transcript of trial and the denial of the motion for reconsideration, it is clear that the trial 
court in fact made sufficient and specific findings on all material elements. 
In the recent case of Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), the 
Court found on appeal that Mr. Moon had simply reargued his own evidence and because 
he failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, the Appellate Court 
had to assume that the record supported the findings of the trial court. Similarly, in this 
case, the failure to marshal the evidence must also lead to this Court of Appeals to affirm 
the findings of the trial court as complete and correct, for purposes of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly applied the child support statutes in this case and correctly 
followed the controlling law in this matter. Given the material change in circumstances 
which occurred when for the first time, the visitation schedule was quantified resulting in 
over 25% of the nights for Petitioner, the trial court was mandated to calculate child 
support based on a joint physical custody worksheet. 
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The trial court did not misunderstand the standard for support modification or 
misapply the standard. The child support guidelines sets forth a clear procedure for 
modification which was followed in this case and all elements of that procedure were 
correctly met. For these reasons, it is appropriate that the trial court order be affirmed in 
all respects and this appeal denied as there has been no abuse of discretion established 
herein. 
Respectfully submitted this ? / day of //goMCU^ 2000. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
Suzanne Marelius 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
(801) 531-0435; Fax: 575-7834 
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D. Michael Nielsen (#3668) 
Sessions Place 
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Bountiful, UT 84010 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Utah Code Annotated, §78-45-2 A-l 
2. Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.2 (Application of Child 
Support Guidelines) A-3 
3. Utah Code Annotated §78-45-8 (Continuing Jurisdiction) A-5 
4. Transcript of Ruling on Motion for Reconsideration, April 20, 
1999, the Honorable Jon M. Memmott A-6 
5. Order on Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial, June 23, 
1999, the Honorable Jon M. Memmott A-15 
K:\WPDATA\Suzanne-2000\January\Boyce - Brief to Appellate Court, wpd 
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78-45-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Adjusted gross income" means income calculated under Subsection 
78-45-7.6(1). 
(2) "Administrative agency" means the Office of Recovery Services. 
(3) "Base child support award" means the award that may be ordered 
and is calculated using the guidelines before additions for medical ex-
penses and work-related child care costs. 
(4) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support 
table," "base child support obligation table," "low income table," or "table" 
means the appropriate table in Section 78-45-7.14. 
(5) "Child" means a son or daughter younger than 18 years of age and 
a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated 'from earning a living 
and is without sufficient means. 
(6) "Court" means the district court, juvenile court, or administrative 
agency which may enter a child support order as defined iir Section 
62A-11-401. 
(7) "Earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal ser-
vices, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or 
otherwise, and specifically includes periodic payment pursuant to pension 
or retirement programs, or insurance policies of ajiy type. Earnings 
specifically includes all gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both 
combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital 
assets. 
(8) "Guidelines" means the child support guidelines in Sections 78-45-
7.2 through 78-45-7.21. 
(9) "IV-D" means Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 
601 et seq. 
(10) "Joint physical custody" means the child-stays with each parent 
overnight for more than 25% of the year, and.both parents contribute to 
the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support. 
(11) "Medical expenses" means health and dental expenses and related 
insurance costs. -
(12) "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed. 
(13) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support. 
(14) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Services within the Depart-
ment of Human Services. 
(15) "Parent" includes a natural parent, an adoptive parent, or a 
stepparent. 
(16) "Split custody" means that each parent has physical custody of at 
least one of the children. 
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78 45 3 
(17) "State" includes any state, territory, or possession of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
(18) "Stepchild" means any child having a stepparent 
(19) "Stepparent" means a person ceremonially married to a child's 
natural or adoptive custodial parent who is not the child's natural or 
adoptive parent or a person living with the natural or adoptive parent as 
a common law spouse, whose common law marriage was entered into in 
this state under Section 30-1-4 5 or m any other state which recognizes the 
validity of common law marriages 
(20) "Work-related child care costs" means reasonable child care costs 
for up to a full-time work week or training schedule as necessitated by the 
employment or training oLthe custodial parent under Section 78-45-7 17 
(21) "Worksheets" means the forms used to aid in calculating the base 
child support award 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 2; 1979, ch. 
131, § 1; 1982, ch. 63, § 1; 1989, ch. 214, § 2; 
1990, ch. 100, § 1; 1994, ch. 118, § 1; 1994, 
ch. 140, § 13. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
ment by ch 140, effective May 2, 1994, added 
the definition of "office" and redesignated the 
other subsections accordingly 
The 1994 amendment by ch 118, effective 
July 1, 1994, added Subsections (2), (6), (9), 
(11), and (20) and redesignated the remaining 
subsections accordingly, in Subsection (3), in-
serted "that may be ordered and is" and deleted 
"uninsured" before "medical expenses", m Sub-
section (4) inserted "base child support obhga 
tion table," "low income table," and "appropn 
ate", in Subsection (8), substituted "78-45-7 21" 
for "78-45-7 18", deleted former Subsection (15) 
which defined "total child support award", and 
made stylistic changes 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel 
Federal Law. - Title IV-D of the federal 
Social Security Act is codified as 42 U S C 
§ 651 et seq 
Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30 
of this title 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Joint physical custody 
Cited 
Joint physical custody. 
Court-ordered visitation that included a total 
of over 120 overnight stays per year, plus addi-
tional visitation days, exceeded the threshold 
for joint physical custody under Subsection (10) 
and, thus, the court was required to follow the 
mandate of the child support guidelines and 
use the joint custody child support worksheet 
or make findings of fact justifying its deviation 
Udy v Udy, 893 P2d 1097 (Utah Ct App 1995) 
Cited m Jeffenes v Jeffenes, 752 P2d 909 
(Utah Ct App 1988), Asper v Asper, 753 P2d 
978 (Utah Ct App 1988), Ball v Peterson, 912 
P2d 1006 (Utah Ct App 1996) 
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78-45-7,2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal. 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing 
or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable pre-
sumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or 
permanent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and consider-
ations required by the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the 
application of the guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent with 
these guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the 
provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the 
conclusion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an 
award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappro-
priate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to 
rebut the presumption in that case. 
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of 
that parent and are not children in common to both parties may at the 
option of either party be taken into account under the guidelines in setting 
or modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsection (5). 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obliga-
tions of the respective parents for the additional children. The obligations 
shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before 
determining the award in the instant case. 
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or 
adoptive children other than those in common to both parties may be applied 
to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be applied to justify a 
decrease in the award. 
(6) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within the 
previous three years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may petition 
the court to adjust the amount of a child support order. 
(b) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (6)(a), the court shall, 
taking into account the best interests of the child, determine whether 
there is a difference between the amount ordered and the amount that 
would be required under the guidelines. If there is a difference of 10% or 
more and the difference is not of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust 
the amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines. 
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not necessary 
for an adjustment under Subsection (6)(b). 
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78-45-7.2 JUDICIAL CODE 
(7) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the 
court to adjust the amount of a child support order if there has been a 
substantial change in circumstances. 
(b) For purposes of Subsection (7)(a), a substantial change in circum-
stances may include: 
(i) material changes in custody; 
(ii) material changes in the relative wealthror assets of the parties; 
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the incomfe of a parent; 
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn; 
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; and 
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent 
for the support of others. 
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (7)(a), the court shall, 
taking into account the best interests of the child, determine whether a 
substantial change has occurred. If it has, the court shall then determine 
whether the change results in a difference of 15% or more between the 
amount of child support ordered and the amount that would be required 
under the guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is not 
of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust the amount of child support 
ordered to that which is provided for in the guidelines. 
(8) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (&) 
and (7) shall be included in each child support order issued or modified after 
July 1, 1997. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, e n a c t e d by L. A m e n d m e n t Notes , — The 1997 amend-
1989, ch. 214, § 4; 1990, ch. 100, 5 3; 1990, ment, effective July W 9 9 7 rewrote Subsection 
ch. 275, $ 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 4; 1997, ch . 232, (6) and added Subsections (7) and (8). 
§ 72. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited m Bnnkerhoff v. Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d 
113 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Application of child-support guide-
lines to cases of joint-, split-, or similar shared-
custody arrangements, 57 A.L.R.5th 389. 
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78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction. 
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order of support 
where justice requires. 
ffistory: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 8. 
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction 
of district court, § 78-3-4. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
***** 
TYLER DARAN BOYCE 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS . 
TAMMY LINGE BOYCE 
DEFENDANT, 
TRANSCRIPT OF RULING 
CASE NO# 964701453 
***** 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON 
REGULARLY FOR HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JON M. 
MEMMOTT, SITTING AT FARMINGTON ON THE 20TH OF APRIL, 
1999 . 
APPEARANCES 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: SUZANNE MARELIUS 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: D. MICHEAL NIELSEN 
COPY 
REPORTED/TRANSCRIBED BY JOANNE PRATT, CSR 
800 WEST STATE STREET 
FARMINGTON, UT 84 02 5 
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APRIL 20, 1999 
THE COURT: THE COURT WILL MAKE THE 
FOLLOWING FINDINGS. THAT AT THE HEARING AT THE 
TRIAL AND EVIDENCE THAT THE COURT HEARD, EVIDENCE 
THAT THEY WERE NOT -- THAT THEY HAD AGREED TO JOINT 
PHYSICAL AND LEGAL CUSTODY. THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN 
ABLE TO IMPLEMENT THE VISITATION SCHEDULE. THAT THE 
COURT FOUND A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VISITATION SCHEDULE. THE 
COURT FOUND, BASED ON THE AGREEMENT AND THAT THE 
CUSTODY ARRANGEMENT WHICH THE COURT HAD FOUND BASED 
ON THE LIBERAL VISITATION SCHEDULE, THAT THE 
APPROPRIATE CUSTODY OR CHILD SUPPORT SCHEDULE WAS 
THE JOINT CUSTODY. AND DOING THAT BASED ON FURTHER 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANT, THE COURT FOUND 
THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS THAT SHE NOT WORK 
AND THEREFORE THE COURT -- WITH THE PREVIOUS 
SCHEDULE SHE HAD WORKED FULL-TIME THE COURT FOUND 
SHE WAS NOT WORKING AND IT WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF BOTH HER AND THE CHILDREN TO STAY AT HOME AND 
THEREFORE, THE COURT IMPUTED NO INCOME IN THE 
DETERMINATION OF HER SCHEDULE. AND I BELIEVE THAT 
THAT WAS THE RULING OF THE COURT. I DON'T 
BELIEVE -- I WOULD GUESS THAT THE BASIS OF THIS 
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THERE IS A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IF THERE'S AN 
ERROR AT LAW. AND WHILE YOU'VE CHARACTERIZED THIS 
AS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION --
MR. NIELSEN: NO. IT'S A MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OR A NEW TRIAL. 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND. I'M SAYING I 
WOULD ASSUME YOU HAVE DONE THIS THAT THERE HAS BEEN 
AN ERROR OF LAW. BASED ON THE UDY DECISION WHICH I 
USED AND WHICH THE COURT INDICATED THAT ONCE --
HOWEVER YOU DETERMINE IT, ONCE THIS VISITATION 
SCHEDULE IS DONE, WHAT THE APPELLATE COURT INDICATED 
IS THAT I WAS REQUIRED TO USE THIS SCHEDULE FOR 
DETERMINING SUPPORT. AND I BELEVE THAT WHAT THIS 
COURT DID IN DOING THAT WAS FOLLOW THAT DECISION.. 
AND IF I DIDN'T CORRECTLY FOLLOW IT, THEN I GUESS 
IT'S GOING TO BE A BASIS FOR THE APPELLATE COURT TO 
SAY THAT I DIDN'T FOLLOW IT CORRECTLY BECAUSE THE 
ATTEMPT OF THIS COURT WAS TO FOLLOW THE LAW AS SET 
FORTH IN THAT DECISION. 
MR. NIELSEN: THE ONLY COMMENT I HAVE, 
JUDGE, AND IS THE COURT AWARE UDY VERSUS UDY WAS NOT 
A MODIFICATION. IT'S A CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION. 
THE COURT: UH-HUH. 
MR. NIELSEN: OKAY. THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: AND THEREFORE, THE COURT WILL 
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DENY THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
MR. NIELSEN: YOUR HONOR, IF THE COURT'S 
GOING TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES, I'LL NEED TO SPEAK TO IT. 
THE COURT: WHY DON'T YOU SPEAK TO IT. 
MR. NIELSEN: WHEN THE FIRST ORDER WAS 
SUBMITTED BY MISS MARELIUS, IT HAD MANY THINGS THAT 
WHILE A GOOD IDEA, WERE NOT IN THE TRIAL. LET ME 
REFRESH THE COURT'S MEMORY. WE HAD A TELEPHONIC 
CONFERENCE ABOUT THAT. 
THE COURT: I DO. 
MR. NIELSEN: AND YES, MY DEMEANOR HAS BEEN 
INAPPROPRIATE IN THE CASE AND I APOLOGIZE FOR THAT. 
BUT I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THAT'S APPROPRIATE EITHER 
FOR MISS MARELIUS TO DO JUST BECAUSE WE THINK THAT'S 
A GOOD IDEA. IF IT WASN'T PART OF THE COURT'S 
RULING, IT SHOULDN'T BE IN THE HEARING. IT 
SHOULDN'T BE IN THE ORDER. IT SHOULD EVEN BE 
DRAFTED AS A STIPULATION AND SENT TO THE OTHER 
ATTORNEY, SIGNED AND SUBMITTED AND IT WASN'T, SO THE 
COURT EVENTUALLY STRUCK ALL THAT. IN OTHER WORDS, 
WHAT I'M SAYING IS, I PREVAILED ON MY MOTION IN 
OPPOSITION TO HER -- MY OBJECTION TO HER ORDER. I 
WILL ADMIT WE BOTH EXPENDED ATTORNEYS FEES PLACING 
THIS ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT, BUT I THINK IT'S A 
/4-T 
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VALID CONCERN, JUDGE. AND I REALLY WANTED TO HEAR 
WHERE THE COURT WAS COMING FROM TO SATISFY MY 
CLIENT, MYSELF AND TO MAKE THE DECISIONS AS TO WHAT 
WE DO IN THE FUTURE. 
SEE, IT REALLY ISN'T A PROBLEM RIGHT NOW 
BECAUSE YOU ARE RIGHT. SHE DOESN'T WORK. BUT YOUR 
HONOR, IN FIVE YEARS -- THIS IS A YOUNG CHILD. WE 
GOT A LOT OF YEARS OF CHILD SUPPORT LEFT. IN FIVE 
YEARS WHEN SHE MAKES PRETTY WELL EQUAL MONEY OR EVEN 
15 OR 20 -- SHE'S A SCHOOL TEACHER. WHEN SHE GOES 
BACK TO THAT, CHILD SUPPORT DROPS TO ABSOLUTELY 
NOTHING BECAUSE OF THE COURT'S DECISION. AND SO I 
BELIEVE IT WAS A VALID CONCERN AND I APOLOGIZE FOR 
DEMEANOR BUT NOT FOR CONTENT. I THINK IT NEEDED TO 
BE HEARD AND I APPRECIATE THE COURT'S EXPLANATIONS 
TO US . 
MS. MARELIUS: WELL, JUST AS TO WHETHER OR 
NOT IT WAS -- THE MODIFICATIONS MADE TO THE ORDER 
WERE CORRECT OR NOT, I STILL I THINK THEY WERE. IN 
FACT I KNOW. I'VE BEEN IN THIS CASE SINCE THE 
BEGINNING AND THEY WERE DISCUSSED AT PRETRIAL. IT'S 
TRUE THAT THE TRANSCRIPT DOESN'T SAY THE PARTIES 
AGREE IN MEDIATION TO THESE. AND IT'S PARENTING 
TERMS WE'RE TALKING ABOUT, A DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
MECHANISM. SOME OF THE PARENTING CONTENT THAT THEY 
fi-to 
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DID AT MEDIATION. AND IT WAS NOT RECITED AT TRIAL 
AND I GUESS THAT WAS AN ERROR. MR. CATHCART AND I 
AGREED TO IT AT THE PRETRIAL. SO IT REALLY WASN'T 
EVEN IN OUR MINDS AT TRIAL AND I BELIEVE IT WAS 
FULLY DISCUSSED AND AGREED BY THE PARTIES. I THINK 
IT'S SIGNIFICANT THAT THE TRIAL WAS JULY 13. THE 
OBJECTIONS BY MR. NIELSEN WERE -- AND THE FINDINGS 
AND ORDER WERE DONE FIVE DAYS LATER AND THEN ON THE 
18TH THESE VAGUE OBJECTIONS WERE FILED. WE HAD A 
PHONE CONFERENCE OCTOBER 19 WHERE ONLY ONE WORD WAS 
CHANGED IN ALL OF THAT CONTENT. AND WE AGREED TO 
MAKING SOMETHING MUTUAL AS FAR AS INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE, I BELIEVE. AND THEN THIS MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER CAME A MONTH LATER. SO I FRANKLY THINK 
IT'S A PRETTY SLIM READ WHEN IT COMES TO THE ISSUING 
OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO SAY THAT OBJECTION WAS SO 
MEANINGFUL WHEN ALL OF OUR TIME, 90 PERCENT OF THE 
TIME, HAS BEEN ON THIS RESPONSE AND THE MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER. 
MR. NIELSEN: AND THAT'S NOT A CORRECT 
REPRESENTATION. ENTIRE PARAGRAPHS WERE STRICKEN, 
NOT ONE. AND I'M SORRY THAT WE HAD TO GO THROUGH 
THAT. AND I MAKE NO APOLOGY FOR THE MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER. I THINK IT'S VALID. BY THE WAY, JUDGE, 
JUST FOR THE RECORD, IT IS NOT JUST A MOTION TO 
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RECONSIDER. IT'S A MOTION TO RECONSIDER OR FOR A 
NEW TRIAL BECAUSE SUZANNE'S RIGHT. THERE'S NO SUCH 
THING AS A MOTION TO RECONSIDER. WE'D ALL LIKE TO 
THINK THERE WAS. BUT IT'S FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
THE COURT: ONE OF THE THINGS AS A NEW 
TRIAL, ONE OF THE THINGS THAT CONCERNS ME IS THE 
EVIDENCE, I GUESS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENTED AT 
THE NEW TRIAL FOR THE STATE. (UNINTELLIGIBLE) THAT 
WASN'T REALLY PRESENTED. I MEAN, THERE WAS THE ONE 
LETTER, AFFIDAVIT, BUT THERE WASN'T REALLY EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED OF WHAT WOULD BE PRESENTED IF WE HAD A NEW 
TRIAL. SO REALLY IT WAS TREATED IN TERMS OF 
PLEADING MORE AS A MOTION TO RECONSIDER THAN IT WAS 
A MOTION FOR NEW RETRIAL BASED ON THE EVIDENCE THAT 
WAS SUBMITTED WITH. THE COURT IS GOING TO DENY THE 
MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS FEES. I THINK THIS HAS BEEN A 
DIFFICULT CASE. I'M NOT SURE (UNINTELLIGIBLE) I DO 
HAVE SOME CONCERNS THE WAY IT'S BEEN HANDLED, BUT 
I'M NOT GOING TO (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
MR. NIELSEN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. MAYBE 
SHOULD I DRAFT AND SUBMIT AN ORDER FOR THE COURT. 
MS. MARELIUS: I'D BE GLAD TO. 
MR. NIELSEN: ONLY THING I'D ASK THAT IT SAY 
MOTION TO RECONSIDERR OR A NEW TRIAL SO THAT THE 
RIGHT TO APPEAL IS PRESERVED IN CASE MY CLIENT 
/f-/Z-
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DECIDES ON THAT. I APPRECIATE THE COURT'S PATIENCE 
WITH ME AND COUNSEL TOO. 
(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED) 
/f-/3 
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CERTIFICATE. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS 
COUNTY OF DAVIS) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE 
FOREGOING % PAGES OF TRANSCRIPT TRANSCRIBED FROM 
VIDEOTAPE CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF 
THE PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND 
ABILITY AS A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
DATED AT FARMINGTON, UTAH T H I S / © DAY 
OF TT 1999 . 
A-ti 
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SUZANNE MARELIUS (2081) JUN 25 II 46 Aii '99 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East Lf> 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
Facsimile: (801)575-7834 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
TYLER BOYCE, | 
I ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
Plaintiff, j RECONSIDERATION OR NEW TRIAL 
vs. { 
TAMMY L. GOBLE, \ 
| Case No.: 964701453 DA 
I Judge: Jon M. Memmott 
Defendant. ! 
ooOoo 
The Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial came before the Court on 
April 20, 1999 before the Honorable Jon Memmott presiding. Plaintiff was present in person 
and represented by Suzanne Marelius. Defendant was present in person and represented by 
counsel Michael Nielsen. The Court heard argument, reviewed the record and file herein and 
made the following findings and ruling: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial is denied. 
2. The Court finds that at the time of trial herein July 31, 1998 the Court heard 
evidence that the parties agreed in their original divorce stipulation to joint legal and joint 
physical custody of their minor children and liberal visitation. The Court found that since entry 
1 
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of the Decree there have been substantial, material changes in circumstances wherein the parties 
were unable to agree on a visitation schedule and that both parties filed petitions to modify 
stating that the joint custody terms of the Decree were unworkable. At trial, the Court found 
that the parties had resolved many disputes in mediation and through the temporary orders of 
the Court including having agreed to continue the joint legal and joint physical custody of their 
children and having agreed on a visitation schedule awarding to Plaintiff Tyler Boyce 37% of 
the time with the children, and Defendant having 63% of the time with the children. Based on 
the new visitation schedule and percentages of time sharing, the Court deemed it appropriate that 
the parties use a joint physical custody worksheet to calculate the amount of future child support. 
3. Further, at the time of trial, the Court learned through testimony that Mrs. Goble, 
the Defendant was not working full-time having previously been a school teacher and was 
currently staying home with the children. Based on that change, the Court sua sponte deemed 
it appropriate that zero income be imputed to Defendant for purposes of calculating child 
support. 
4. The Court considered the Plaintiffs Motion for attorneys fees and finds that 
although Defendant did not really present evidence in her Motion which would have been 
considered in a new trial, that both parties reasonably incurred fees for the post-trial motions and 
each should bear their own costs and fees. 
DATED this iSh -frrflof " 3 I A / V ^ , 1999. 
Approval^ to Farm: / ^ 
BY THE COURT: 
fr^Nr 
The Honorable Jon M. Memmott 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
A--/6 
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